Aerospace Groups Ask Trump Administration for Tariff Relief

TO OUR RV-10 PILOTS & BUILDERS

PLEASE READ THIS ARTICLE FROM FLYING MAGAZINE AND BE CERTAIN YOUR DOORS ARE PROPERLY BUILT AND FUNCTION AS INTENDED!

Witness told investigators that as the Van’s kitplane cleared the end of the runway, he saw an arm reach up and pull down the open left-side, gull-wing door.

Accident investigators are scrutinizing an unsecured cockpit door as a causal factor in the fatal crash of an Van’s RV-10 crash into a factory near Fullerton Municipal Airport (KFUL) in California. 

The January 2 accident was caught on a video surveillance camera across the street from the airport. Audio shared by Los Angeles’ KABC-TV indicated the kitbuilt aircraft took off from KFUL around 2 p.m. PST from Runway 24 with the pilot and his 16-year-old daughter on board.

According to a preliminary accident report released by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), a witness who was an acquaintance of the pilot told investigators that he observed the pilot in the left seat of the aircraft and his daughter in the right seat as they taxied from their hangar at the southeast corner of the airport toward the run-up area of Runway 24.

• READ MORE: 2 killed, 19 Injured After Van's RV-10 Crashes in California

"Security video footage revealed that the airplane was in the run-up area for about three minutes, and during that time although the left door was in the down position, it was not flush with the fuselage," NTSB said.

The RV-10 is equipped with two gull-wing doors—one on either side of the cabin. The doors are composed mostly of fiberglass and attached to the aircraft by two steel hinges with extension limited by a gas strut. The door is secured by fore and aft aluminium latch pins that extend into UHMW polyethylene pin blocks mounted to the forward and aft pillar structure in the airframe door opening. The latch pins are connected to the door lock handle using a rotary gear assembly. To lock the door, the handle is rotated forward. This extends the latch pins into the pin blocks. The handle contains a release lever that locks the pins in place when they have reached the fully extended position.

To open the door, the release lever must be pressed. The door includes a secondary safety latch system, which was intended to clasp the door in the down position should the lock handle not be manually engaged.

Any uncommanded door opening in flight can be surprising, and if the aircraft has gull-wing doors, there is usually a noticeable change in directional control as the door comes up. Van’s Aircraft addressed this issue in 2010, adding as standard in all RV-10 finish kits a secondary door latch and issuing a service bulletin that recommended the installation of the secondary latch before further flights.

Audio recordings provided by the FAA confirm that at 2:02 p.m., the pilot called the tower for a takeoff clearance.

According to the aircraft's Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS), the pilot instigated the takeoff roll at 2:07 p.m., reaching an altitude of approximately 60 feet above ground level and a ground speed of about 108 knots as it cleared the airport boundary. 

The airplane continued to climb and accelerate on runway heading for about 30 seconds, then the pilot transmitted “immediate landing required” over the control tower frequency.

The tower controller asked the pilot if he could make a left turn and cleared the airplane for landing on any runway. After a few exchanges, the pilot reported that he would return for landing on Runway 24.

According to NTSB, within 30 seconds of the pilot's request to return, the airplane had completed a 180-degree turn and reached an altitude of 950 feet msl, decelerating to 95 knots. The aircraft entered a left downwind, and about 40 seconds later continued to descend as it passed the Runway 24 threshold, slowing to 85 knots and entering a left turn.

The tower reported there was an unintelligible transmission as the aircraft was at an altitude of 435 feet msl and continued in a steep left turn until it collided with the roof of the factory located 1,500 feet from the approach end of Runway 24.

A witness on the airport ramp south of Runway 24 told investigators he saw the airplane's takeoff. As it cleared the end of the runway, he noticed the left door was open and up, and he saw an arm reach up and pull the door down.

The NTSB report said that multiple pilot witnesses observed the airplane in the pattern, describing it as "flying lower than normal and banking aggressively left as it made the transition from downwind to base."

Three witnesses described the left turn to final as aggressive and were concerned that the aircraft would stall. The aircraft then rolled to the right and the nose dropped as a piece of the airplane described as "panel-like" floated to the ground. The airplane—still in a steep bank—descended into the building and exploded.

The NTSB learned during the investigation that the pilot of the aircraft received the primary components for the kit in 2007 and 2008, and completed the airframe in 2011. He received the secondary door latch in January 2010, but examination of the wreckage showed the pilot did not install it.

In addition, investigators determined that the pilot had made a series of modifications to the standard door-locking system, "including the use of solid steel locking pins rather than the kit-supplied aluminum pins, along with replacement of the UHMW polythene door blocks with chamfered aluminum blocks." The door latch indicator system had also been modified.

NTSB said that the main components of the aircraft—including fuselage, forward cabin, and both wings—were found at the crash site inside the building. The left door was "found on the building’s roof about 150 feet southeast of the impact point and directly below the airplane's flight path," the report said. 

According to the NTSB, the door had pulled away from its roof hinges, and the door handle was found just short of the forward closed and locked position. Because it was not fully forward, its locking button had not engaged.

Investigators said that the lock pins were found extended about a half an inch out of the door ends. When the door handle was tested by moving it forward, the pins extended farther and the locking button engaged.

Additionally, NTSB determined that the door latch indicator system supplied with the kit, which consists of four magnetic reed switches mounted individually within each door pillar, was not installed. The switches were configured to confirm via LED warning lamps on the instrument panel that each door pin was in the fully extended and locked position.

"On the accident airplane, it appeared that only two reed switches had been installed, with each mounted to the aft pillars of both doors," NTSB said. "As such, the modified system would not have warned the pilot if the forward latch pins had failed to fully engage."

FEB 11, 2025

Association notes that Experimental-Amateur Built aircraft are not included in STCs.

Last week, the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) weighed in on the controversy surrounding G100UL unleaded aviation gasoline from General Aviation Modifications Inc. (GAMI). As an advocacy group for Experimental-Amateur Built (E-AB) aircraft, among others, EAA’s statement focused on specific concerns for E-AB builders and operators.

While EAA noted that G100UL has been authorized for use in “most certified aircraft” through the Approved Model List Supplemental Type Certificate (AML STC) process, EAA reminded its members, “It is important for owners of E-AB aircraft to remember that STCs only apply to type-certificated aircraft. E-AB aircraft do not have type certificates and, thereby, are not covered by an STC.” The statement also noted that some materials used in E-AB aircraft are different from those found on certified aircraft and it’s possible those materials were not considered in granting the STC. “Testing protocols for STCs are proprietary, and to date a list of materials tested has not been shared with owners and operators,” EAA wrote.

Among the components cited by EAA as of concern are fuel tank sealants, gaskets, O-rings and hoses as well as any other materials that could come into contact with the fuel either through normal operation or in the event of a spill or leakage.

EAA provided links to information made available from GAMI on installation instructions, instructions for continued airworthiness and routine refueling hygiene.

The aviation community has long recognized the need to eliminate lead emissions from piston-engine aircraft, a goal set to be achieved by the end of 2030 through the leadership of the Eliminate Aviation Gasoline Lead Emissions (EAGLE) initiative. This ambitious endeavor brings together government and industry partners committed to finding a safe and reliable unleaded aviation fuel that is viable throughout the aviation supply chain.

As the general aviation community works toward this goal, the role of aircraft owners cannot be overstated. They are, after all, the ultimate end-users of any new fuel, and their buy-in will be critical to its success.

This transition is about more than meeting regulatory requirements—it’s about ensuring that aircraft owners feel confident in the safety and reliability and availability of the new fuel. The solution must be robust enough to meet the diverse needs of the piston-engine fleet, ranging from the World War II era planes to modern helicopters.

Currently, there are three promising unleaded fuel candidates. Their developers are pursuing either the Fleet Authorization (FA) under the Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative (PAFI) or the traditional Supplemental Type Certification (STC) process via an approved model list (AML). Both pathways ensure that engines and aircraft can safely operate on the new fuel, however, regardless of the path to approval to use in the aircraft, consumer acceptance will hinge on more than FAA approval.

Fuel developers must not only prove their products’ safety and compatibility with the existing fleet but also demonstrate to key industry stakeholders that their product is reliable. Aircraft owners need assurance that switching to a new fuel won’t void manufacturer warranties. They also need to be confident that it won’t cause damage to paint, electronics, engine components or fuel systems. The aviation supply chain will need assurances as well. This next fuel must be produced, distributed, stored, possibly comingled with other fuels, pumped, and consumed without causing damage or requiring significant equipment modifications. Industry stakeholders understand that any new fuels must meet the needs of aircraft owners and be compatible with production, distribution and dispensing systems.

EAGLE has worked diligently over the past 18 months to keep stakeholders informed, providing updates on the progress of key unleaded fuel developers. General Aviation Modifications Inc.’s (GAMI) G100UL and Swift Fuels’ 100R are advancing through the STC process. GAMI has already secured a broad Approved Model List (AML) STC for its fuel in 2022 for piston engines and airplanes. Recently, the FAA granted Swift Fuels its first STC for the use of its 100R in Cessna 172 R & S model aircraft powered by Eliminate Aviation Gasoline Lead Emissions (EAGLE) Lycoming IO-360-L2A engines, with many additional engines and airframes being evaluated for approval in the weeks ahead. LyondellBasell/VP Racing’s UL100E is progressing through the PAFI pathway, having completed about 25 percent of critical materials compatibility and full-scale engine detonation and performance testing. Both Swift Fuels and LyondellBasell/VP Racing have also begun working through ASTM International on the development of an industry consensus production specification for their respective fuels.

The recent updates from EAGLE provide optimism. To learn more visit: flyEAGLE.org (See Stakeholder Meetings). Progress is being made, and general aviation’s path to acceptance of unleaded fuel continues.

Congress and the FAA’s commitment to this initiative is underscored by the 2024 FAA Reauthorization, which supports the continued availability of 100-octane low-lead (100LL) avgas until the end of 2030, or when a certified unleaded alternative is available at airports. (Alaska, a state heavily reliant on piston-engine aircraft, has been given a slightly extended timeline protecting continued availability of 100LL through the end of 2032). However, the collaborative industry/government EAGLE goal is clear: the elimination of leaded aviation fuel by the end of 2030.

General aviation is moving to ensure a safe, reliable transition to unleaded avgas without jeopardizing the operational safety of the piston-engine fleet. Aircraft owners must stay informed and engaged as this transition unfolds. It is important that they educate themselves on any restrictions that may accompany an STC and comply with any OEM directives that may be issued. They are the key players in this process, and their comfort with these new fuels will drive this monumental shift.

It is not enough for the FAA to approve these new fuels. The industry—from aircraft owners to fuel distributors to FBOs that dispense fuel and aircraft manufacturers that provide continued operational support—must accept them. Safety, reliability, and commercial viability must guide this transition, ensuring that by the end of 2030, piston-engine aircraft can take to the skies with unleaded fuel that is dependable. The future of general aviation depends on it.

The Eliminate Aviation Gasoline Lead Emissions (EAGLE) initiative is a comprehensive public-private partnership consisting of the aviation and petroleum industries and U.S. government stakeholders, and a wide range of other constituents and interested parties, all working toward the transition to lead-free aviation fuels for piston-engine aircraft by the end of 2030 without compromising the safety or economic health of the general aviation industry. To learn more, visit: https://flyEAGLE.org

A yearslong investigation determined that cold-bending a metal wing spar to create a dihedral also creates the risk of future fatigue and failure, and more than 21,000 Piper aircraft will have new wing spar life limits and recurring inspections required under a pair of proposed airworthiness directives.

The FAA published two new proposed ADs in recent weeks that continue a series of actions and investigations the FAA began following a 2018 wing separation accident involving a Piper Arrow that killed a commercial pilot applicant and designated pilot examiner. The agency has since noted fatigue cracks of the main spar were also found in two additional accidents involving PA–28 series Pipers, in 1987 and 1993.

The FAA published AD 2020-26-16 a little more than two years later, updating guidance and directives dating back to 2018, and requiring eddy current inspections of thousands of Piper wing spars, including various PA–28 and PA–32 series models. 

The results of those inspections informed a new directive, AD 2024-00008-A, published on September 19, followed by AD 2024-00033-A, published on September 23. 

The new directives establish or expand a wing spar inspection regime to include all PA–28 and PA–32 series single-engine Piper aircraft. The FAA noted that all of these aircraft have a common spar design, with varying degrees of reinforcement in the original structure.

The FAA noted that a redesigned wing spar assembly is available from Piper, as well as a reinforcing kit that can be installed on many newer PA–28s including the Cherokee, Warrior, Archer, and Piper Pilot models. The spar reinforcement kit enables longer inspection intervals, and a longer life limit—up to 25,000 hours for a reinforced spar, instead of 12,000 hours or 13,499 hours for an unmodified wing spar. 

The FAA also updated the formula for calculating service time that enables risk-based grouping of aircraft (the same formula for calculated service hours, or CSH, that was previously detailed in Piper Service Bulletin 1372 published on April 3) to determine required inspection intervals, and establish life limits for wing spars made with a particular process that Piper has now discontinued: bending the cold spar to create the dihedral. 

“In an attempt to support less onerous inspections and to understand the causal factors, Piper investigated the residual stresses in the critical bolt-hole area. That investigation showed that the residual stress due to the spar cold bending process is a significant contributing factor in reducing the fatigue life of the spar bolt holes,” the FAA wrote in the AD published September 23 that applies to an estimated 10,665 aircraft previously subject to required spar inspections under the 2020 directive. “An additional outcome of this investigation is a change to all new manufactured spars having machined dihedral bends to eliminate the residual stresses in the critical area.”

An identical paragraph appears in the AD published on September 19, which applies to an estimated 10,927 PA–28 and PA–32 series aircraft that will now be subject to initial and recurring eddy current spar inspections based on the aircraft’s history, including (calculated) time in service and other factors. 

Comments on both directives will be accepted into early November. 

“We’re relieved to see that Piper has designed a reinforcing kit that will help ease the burden on owners and mitigate the safety concern for many aircraft,” said AOPA Vice President of Regulatory Affairs Murray Huling. “We’re also glad to see a spar replacement option now exists that eliminates the need for recurring inspections and corrects the original defect. That said, these directives pertain to a very large number of aircraft and implement a complex formula for assessing risk that we’ll need to look at closely before making our formal comments on these proposed directives.” 

The FAA and Piper received more than 2,800 bolt-hole eddy current inspection reports as required by the 2020 directive (that was published in 2021, and estimated to apply to 5,440 airplanes), and more than 100 of these “reported a positive eddy current indication, with several including pictures of the bolt hole showing the source of the indication.”

While positive findings included various anomalies other than fatigue cracks, the FAA noted that six fatigue cracks were found in and around bolt holes, three of them verified as fatigue cracks by the NTSB and Piper. 

“Other known cracks include those found in an airplane in the same fleet as the 2018 accident airplane, a separately submitted crack finding confirmed with dye penetrant, and a crack located on the lower spar cap surface running alongside the inspection bolt holes,” the FAA wrote. “Given these findings, additional cracks may be present among the other unconfirmed reported indications.”

The FAA noted that fatigue was not the only cause of cracks discovered during the investigations:

“Other cracks have been discovered that may be caused by overload rather than by fatigue. While use of the airplane within its limits should not cause an overload crack, some crack findings have revealed that airplanes have been operated outside their limits. Though cracks due to overload are not the primary source of this corrective action, this emphasizes the need for and importance of inspecting the spar bolt holes for evidence of any cracking.”

The FAA estimates that replacing the wing spar is less expensive than installation of the reinforcement kit, though the agency acknowledged it has no way to know how many aircraft might require either alteration. Spar replacement is estimated to cost $14,383 per wing (including 40 hours of labor), while reinforcing the wing via installation of the $4,000 kit is estimated to cost $20,150 installed, per wing, including 190 hours of labor. (AOPA contacted the FAA, Piper, and maintenance providers seeking clarification on why the spar reinforcement kit installation requires significantly more shop time than a spar replacement.)

While much of the September 23 AD references the Piper Service Bulletin that details the inspection process, the agency did establish a different inspection schedule for the “Group 1” and “Group 2” aircraft than what Piper previously stipulated. 

For Group 1 aircraft (generally newer PA–28s) initial inspections are required at 3,000 CSH, and thereafter at intervals ranging from 1,750 CSH down to 500 CSH, up to 13,499 hours, at which point the spar must be replaced, or a reinforcement kit installed. (Piper’s service bulletin called for an initial inspection at 5,000 CSH.)

Aircraft in this group with kits installed are inspected upon kit installation, and thereafter every 4,800 CSH up to 13,499 hours, and not to exceed every 3,700 hours thereafter, with a 25,000-hour limit on the spar.

The FAA established the same compliance times and inspection intervals for Group 2 aircraft that Piper set forth in Service Bulletin 1372, starting with an initial inspection at 4,500 CSH, and repetitive inspections every 400 CSH thereafter up to 11,999 CSH, when the spar must be replaced or reinforced (if a kit becomes available for Group 2 aircraft). 

“Both the FAA and Piper attempted to determine an inspection program that would manage risk to an acceptable level using inspection alone; however, no method could be found that did not eventually require spar replacement,” the FAA noted. The agency, like Piper, also emphasized the importance of following the prescribed procedures precisely to avoid damaging the wing spar assembly during inspection, which would then require spar replacement: “Ensuring further damage is not caused by the inspection itself is important, especially with repetitive inspections; however, inspecting for fatigue cracks as well as other hole anomalies is critical and outweighs the risk associated with repetitive inspections.”

EAA UPDATE  11/07: 

EAA Submits Comments to FAA Concerning Proposed Piper ADs

EAA, supporting the concerns raised by Piper Aircraft and many commenters, this week submitted comments asking the FAA to rescind two proposed airworthiness directives (AD) that would affect certain PA-28 and PA-32 series aircraft. If implemented, the two ADs would expand the main wing spar inspections already mandated by previous FAA action. EAA and others are concerned that the FAA has failed to properly consider the safety risk and financial burden of the proposed additional inspections.

EAA is concerned that neither proposed AD, as put forward by the FAA, addresses all technical aspects regarding the hazards of expanded inspections and that inspection data gained from AD FAA-2020-26-16 does not support the conclusions drawn by the FAA.

Proposed AD FAA-2024-2142 modifies the formula for calculating the applicable time for eddy current inspections of the lower main wing spar bolt holes, affecting 10,665 airplanes. Damaged wing spars would require repair or replacement. Proposed AD FAA-2024-2143 would require reviewing airplane maintenance records to determine if an eddy current inspection of the lower main wing spar bolt holes was completed. If no previous inspection has been completed, a one-time eddy current inspection of the lower wing spar bolt holes would be required at 12,000 hours. This second AD would affect an additional 10,927 airplanes.

These proposals arise from the findings of inspections required by AD 2020-26-16, which mandate wing spar inspections on some Piper aircraft models. Based on these findings, the FAA is proposing to expand the scope of aircraft needing inspections, modify the inspection intervals, and amend the formula used to calculate aircraft time triggering the inspections.

We also strongly urge the FAA to utilize the data and information provided in Piper’s comments to reconsider the proposed inspections and the scope of aircraft to which they apply.

Pilots and A&P mechanics can bond over setting spark plug gaps or tossing them if they fail to meet muster. 

Diving deeper into the world of aviation spark plugs, we will pull back the cowling and affix our inspection mirror to discuss the types commonly used in different aircraft models, insights into their maintenance, and recommendations for their replacement. 

At their core, spark plugs are devices that deliver electric current from an ignition system to the combustion chamber of an engine, igniting the compressed fuel/air mixture by an electric spark. Properly functioning spark plugs are essential for smooth engine operation and optimal performance.

“The two major types of electrodes in today’s spark plugs include the dual nickel alloy massive electrode and the single Iridium fine-wire electrode," saidAlan Woods, sales manager for piston and power at Champion Aerospacein Liberty, South Carolina. "The nickel alloy electrode design allows for a long-lasting spark plug [300 to 500 hours] at an affordable price. The Iridium fine-wire electrode design offers TBO life [2,000 hours plus] but at a higher cost due to the high cost of Iridium [$4,000 per ounce].”

Massive Electrode Spark Plugs

Massive electrode spark plugs are the most commonly used type in general aviation. They feature large electrodes designed for durability and extended use.

Massive electrode plugs are critical features in terms of durability. They can withstand significant wear and tear, making them ideal for aircraft that undergo frequent and long flights. Massive electrode plugs are also cost-effective. They are generally more affordable than their counterparts, the fine-wire spark plugs. Another attribute is their ease of maintenance. Due to their stout construction, massive electrode plugs are easier to clean and maintain.

There are a few downsides to massive electrode plugs. Over time, massive electrode spark plugs can suffer from performance issues due to electrode wear and increased gap size, leading to less efficient combustion. They are also heavier as the larger electrodes add to the weight, which can be a minor concern in aircraft performance calculations.

Fine-Wire Spark Plugs

Fine-wire spark plugs are designed with thinner electrodes, often made of precious metals such as platinum or Iridium, to provide superior performance and longevity.

The fine-wire plug offers improved ignition over massive electrodes, giving the fine-wire electrodes a more concentrated spark and leading to better combustion and engine performance. They also last longer because they are constructed using durable materials, such as platinum and Iridium, reducing the frequency of replacements. Fine-wire plugs are also lighter than massive electrode plugs, contributing to overall aircraft efficiency.

These enhanced attributes come with a cost. Aircraft fine-wire spark plugs are substantially more expensive than massive electrode spark plugs. They also require careful handling during maintenance to avoid damaging the fine electrodes.

The choice between massive electrode and fine-wire spark plugs often depends on the specific requirements of your aircraft and your flying activity. Massive electrode spark plugs might be more suitable if you fly frequently and cover long distances due to their durability and cost-effectiveness. Fine-wire spark plugs could be the better choice if you prioritize engine performance and are willing to invest in premium parts due to their enhanced ignition efficiency and longevity.

Fine-wire plugs provide a more efficient burn rate and last longer at a much higher purchase price, according to Vince Bechtel, director of aftermarket sales at Tempest Aero Group, which entered the aviation spark plug market in 2010 by acquiring the Autolite brand. A relatively small niche market, the company represents about 10 to 15 percent of the aviation aftermarket. Turbocharged aircraft flying at higher altitudes favor fine-wire plugs, according to Bechtel.

Proper maintenance and timely replacement of spark plugs are crucial to avoid engine misfires and ensure smooth operation. Some tips:

●      Regular inspections: Conduct routine inspections every 100 hours of flight time or as your aircraft’s manufacturer recommends. Check for signs of wear, fouling, or damage. Common issues include carbon buildup, oil fouling, and electrode erosion.

●      Cleaning: Use an approved spark plug cleaner to remove carbon deposits and debris. Be cautious with fine-wire spark plugs to avoid damaging the delicate electrodes.

●      Gap checking: Ensure the spark plug gap meets the manufacturer’s specifications. A correct gap is crucial for optimal spark plug performance. Adjust the gap if necessary using appropriate tools.

●      Replacement: Replace spark plugs at the manufacturer’s recommended intervals or if significant wear or damage is observed during inspections. Always use spark plugs that meet the specifications of your aircraft’s engine model.

“Honestly, the biggest issue I see is over-cleaning," Bechtel said. "Individuals and shops tend to clean plugs until they look brand new out of the packaging. The only thing this does is wear out your electrodes and insulator faster, preventing you from getting the full life out of a set of plugs.”

Even with regular maintenance, spark plug issues can occur. Some common problems and their potential causes include:

Engine Misfire

• Caused by worn electrodes, incorrect gap, or fouled plugs.
• Solution: Inspect, clean, or replace the spark plugs as needed.

Hard Starting

• Often due to spark plug fouling or improper gap.
• Solution: Check and clean the spark plugs and correct the gap.

Poor Engine Performance

• Can result from degraded spark plugs or incorrect heat range.
• Solution: Verify that you are using the correct type and heat range of spark plugs for your engine.

The introduction of fired-in suppressor seal technology, or FISS, is a recent advancement in aircraft engine spark plugs.

"This technology eliminates the high-voltage silicon resistor, which is prone to resistance value increases over time," Woods said. "The FISS technology incorporates fired-in conducting and suppressor glasses that establish the resistance value of the spark plug. This means that the end user has a stable resistance value over the entire life of the spark plug. With the introduction of electronic ignition, spark plug designs will evolve with wider gaps to handle the increased energy being produced.”

Understanding the various types of aviation spark plugs and their benefits and limitations can help you make informed decisions about aircraft maintenance. Whether you choose massive electrode spark plugs for their durability and cost-effectiveness or fine-wire spark plugs for their superior performance and longevity, regular maintenance and timely replacements are critical to engine operation. 

Please consult your aircraft’s technical publications and an A&P mechanic to ensure your spark plugs are in an airworthy condition.

By Vic Syracuse, EAA Lifetime 180848

This piece originally ran in the January 2024 issue of EAA Sport Aviation magazine.

In the November 2021 issue of EAA Sport Aviation I wrote a column entitled “Cooling Things Down.” It was meant to help builders solve some of their cooling problems by providing some insight into the causes. From several discussions with pilots and owners of aircraft since that column, it’s become clear that not everyone understands the differences between EGTs (exhaust gas temperatures) and CHTs (cylinder head temperatures), and whether they are or are not a problem.

Click the link below to read the article:

https://inspire.eaa.org/2024/03/14/understanding-chts-and-egts/?utm_source=ehotline_240314&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=eh_sportaviation_2024&utm_content=honeywell

Thanks to years of EAA’s advocacy efforts, the FAA has unveiled a new program for the use of off-the-shelf parts in type-certificated aircraft. This is the first approval granted under the new Vintage Aircraft Replacement and Modification Article (VARMA) program, the next big step in keeping vintage aircraft flying.

Anyone who owns and operates vintage aircraft knows that finding parts can be a major challenge. This situation is especially frustrating when perfectly safe and functional alternatives are readily available, but can’t be used because there’s been no legal way to install them in a type-certificated aircraft. With VARMA in place, some aspects of vintage aircraft ownership and operation are about to get a lot simpler.

Notably, VARMA uses several existing FAA policies to create a program that requires no new regulations, orders, or advisory circulars. It applies to small (less than 12,500 pounds) type-certificated aircraft built before 1980. The program allows ordinary maintenance personnel to validate that certain low-risk replacement parts are suitable for installation on aircraft, without the need for extensive engineering analysis or complex and time-consuming design and production approvals from the FAA.

"This is great news for those of us who own and fly vintage aircraft,” said Jack Pelton, EAA’s CEO and chairman of the board. “There could easily come a time when a classic airplane that would otherwise be grounded for want of a part that’s no longer available will fly again thanks to the parts substitution enabled by VARMA.”

The program applies to parts whose failure would not “prevent continued safe flight and landing.” While this means that safety-critical components are not subject to this program, there are plenty of hard-to-find parts that meet VARMA’s criteria.

For the trial, EAA chose to apply for an off-the-shelf starter solenoid used as a substitute part in a Cessna 150, as the failure of the starter system is generally irrelevant to flight safety. The FAA granted the first Form 337 approval under the program several weeks later. Since that time, we’ve also been granted approval for alternators and voltage regulators in VFR aircraft.

There are many more parts that are eligible under VARMA. For the time being, the FAA will be primarily managing the program through its Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, which can be reached at 847-294-7357, but VARMA is supported all the way to the highest levels of the agency. At this time approvals will be considered on an individual basis, although type clubs and ownership groups are encouraged to keep track of substitute parts that have gained approval.

“EAA has had a longstanding commitment to maintainability and modernization in the legacy aircraft community,” said Tom Charpentier, EAA’s government relations director. “Our EFIS and autopilot STCs broke new ground in affordable avionics, and it is our hope that VARMA opens many new doors for easily found replacement parts. As with the STC programs, we blazed the trail with the first application. Now we’re excited to see the program grow in the GA community.”

Among the many effects of the supply chain problems in the summer of 2022, aviation discovered that it was having a difficult time functioning without a simple commodity—the oil filter. Lycoming and Continental engines everywhere needed spin-on, disposable oil filters to keep flying, and the supply was extremely limited. KITPLANES research found that Champion had effectively stopped production—though it is now ramping back up—while Tempest was going at their normal production rate and trying mightily to increase it to meet demand. But Tempest simply couldn’t double its production overnight, so suppliers’ shelves emptied as aircraft owners quickly bought up every filter they could find. Remember the toilet paper shortages in the early days of COVID? Yeah, it was sort of like that.

Click below to read the entire article

Following a request from EAA and AOPA, the FAA has released a policy that will make it easier for some owners of experimental aircraft to obtain special flight permits (SFPs) for their airplanes in order to reposition them for condition inspections.