MAKE CHAPTER 288 YOUR AVIATION HOME! E-AB, TYPE CERTIFIED, VINTAGE, WARBIRD, ETC.
Van’s Aircraft continues to investigate potential surface corrosion appearing on the interior aluminum surfaces of specific Quick Build wing and fuselage kits. Kits that are in-scope for this review are those that were assembled by our contract company and delivered to Van’s Aircraft between June 2020 and January 2021. Note that not all kits from this time period are necessarily affected, and the scope of our investigation is intentionally broad at to help ensure sufficient and complete information collection. Click below for an update (as of March 22, 2021)
Following a request from EAA and AOPA, the FAA has released a policy that will make it easier for some owners of experimental aircraft to obtain special flight permits (SFPs) for their airplanes in order to reposition them for condition inspections.
Airworthiness Directives (ADs) are legally enforceable regulations issued by the FAA in accordance with 14 CFR part 39 to correct an unsafe condition in a product (an aircraft, engine, propeller, or appliance). Do you know how to find ADs applicable to your aircraft? Check out this Aviation Maintenance Safety Moment video to see how:
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Superior Air Parts, Inc. (SAP) Model IO-360-series and O-360-series reciprocating engines and certain Lycoming Engines (Lycoming) Model AEIO-360-, IO-360-, and O-360-series reciprocating engines with a certain SAP crankshaft assembly installed.
The advent of the FAA's shift to an electronic airworthiness certification process can be daunting, but it need not be! DAR Arnold Holmes, our "local" DAR can explain what you need to get your aircraft certified. Arnold Holmes is a Private pilot, an A&P Mechanic with Inspection Authorization (IA), and a Designated Airworthiness Representative (DAR). He is a member of EAA and has over 25 years in aviation. Arnold runs DAR-Certification Services at the Leesburg Airport.
Check out his website at https://dar-certification.com.
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Textron Aviation Inc. (Textron) (type certificate previously held by Beechcraft Corporation) Models F90, 65-90, 65-A90, B90, C90, H90 (T-44A), E90, 65-A90-1 (JU-21A, U-21A, RU-21A, RU-21D, U-21G, RU21H), 65-A90-2 (RU-21B), 65-A90-3 (RU-21C), 65-A90-4 (RU-21E, RU-21H), 99, 99A, 99A (FACH), A99, A99A, B99, C99, 100, A100 (U-21F), and B100 airplanes.
This AD was prompted by reports of fatigue cracks in the lower forward wing fitting. This AD requires a one-time inspection for the presence of washer part number (P/N) 90-380058-1 on the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) lower forward wing bolt and, if applicable, removing washer P/N 90-380058-1, inspecting the wing fitting, bolt, and nut, replacing the wing fitting if it is cracked, and replacing the washer with washer P/N 90-380019-1. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. This AD is effective January 11, 2021.
Supplementary Information: The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Textron (type certificate previously held by Beechcraft Corporation) Models F90, 65-90, 65-A90, B90, C90, H90 (T-44A), E90, 65-A90-1 (JU-21A, U-21A, RU-21A, RU-21D, U-21G, RU-21H), 65-A90-2 (RU-21B), 65-A90-3 (RU-21C), 65-A90-4 (RU21E, RU-21H), 99, 99A, 99A (FACH), A99, A99A, B99, C99, 100, A100 (U-21F), and B100 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on July 29, 2020 (85 FR 45545).
The NPRM was prompted by Textron receiving reports of fatigue cracks in the lower forward wing fitting on two airplanes. Investigation revealed that installing washer P/N 90-380058-1 on the wing bolt will cause a premature torque indication. This washer may have been installed as part of kit 101-4024-3 on Models F90, 65-90, 65-A90, B90, C90, H90 (T-44A), E90, 65-A90-1 (JU-21A, U21A, RU-21A, RU-21D, U-21G, RU-21H), 65-A90-2 (RU-21B), 65-A90-3 (RU-21C), 65-A90-4(RU-21E, RU-21H), 99, 99A, 99A (FACH), A99, A99A, B99, C99, 100, A100 (U-21F), and B100 airplanes, or as part of kit 90-4077-1 on Models 65-90, 65-A90, 65-A90-1 (JU-21A, U-21A, RU21A, RU-21D, U-21G, RU-21H), 65-A90-2 (RU-21B), 65-A90-3 (RU-21C), 65-A90-4 (RU-21E, RU-21H), B90, C90, and E90 airplanes. Under-torque of the wing bolt causes a reduced clamping force that changes the load path reacted by the RH and LH lower forward wing fitting.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require a one-time inspection for the presence of washer P/N 90-380058-1 on the LH and RH lower forward wing bolt and, if applicable, removing washer P/N 90-380058-1, inspecting the wing fitting, bolt, and nut, replacing the wing fitting if it is cracked, and replacing the washer with washer P/N 90-380019-1. This condition, if not addressed, could result in fatigue cracks that lead to failure of the forward lower wing fitting, wing separation, and loss of airplane control.
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) Models PA-28-151, PA-28-161, PA-28-181, PA-28-235, PA-28R-180, PA-28R-200, PA-28R-201, PA-28R-201T, PA-28RT-201, PA-28RT-201T, PA-32-260, PA-32-300, PA-32R-300, PA-32RT-300, and PA-32RT-300T airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a wing separation caused by fatigue cracking in a visually inaccessible area of the lower main wing spar cap. This AD requires calculating the factored service hours for each main wing spar to determine when an inspection is required, inspecting the lower main wing spar bolt holes for cracks, and replacing any cracked main wing spar. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. Go to the following link for more information and also the button below:
Here's help from the FAASafety.gov in understanding the details:
Two Piper Spar ADs in Close Succession-but is my plane affected?
Notice Number: NOTC1681
The release of a Piper wing spar inspection AD in November and another one in January has some owners uncertain if their airplanes are affected. Published in November, AD 2020-24-05 was the result of some airplanes with severely corroded spar caps that, in some earlier models, are not easy to access. There is concern that without wing access panels there is a risk for undetected corrosion. The AD requires an inspection for certain airplanes, and optional methods are provided. Aside from the AD, all aircraft should have this area inspected as part of a regular maintenance program; the listed aircraft just may not have access panels and may require a bit more effort to inspect.
AD 2020-26-16, published in January, was the result of some wing failures that were traced to fatigue cracks in the spar. As a method of keeping the focus on the small percentage of higher-risk airplanes, the AD requires us jump through some hoops designed to exclude the majority of (lower risk) airplanes from the inspection requirement. The AD requires any airplane in the applicability chart to meet at least one of three criteria before the AD is applicable. Then, for some airplanes, the factored service hours must be calculated based on the number of 100-hour inspections recorded in the maintenance logs. If the factored service hours require the eddy current inspection to be done, then the AD points to the inspection method contained in Piper SB 1345. Note that the AD only incorporates the “Inspection Method” section of the SB, and not the entire SB. This is because the AD differs from the SB in terms of applicable airplane models, and the hours at which the inspection is required.
What if I complied with SB 1345 before AD 2020-26-16 was released? Well, that depends. If your aircraft has met the above mentioned requirements listed in the AD, then you may request an Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC). If the AD is not applicable to your airplane (even though the SB is), then an AMOC is not necessary. What about those of us who did everything that was in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), before the AD was published? If you have accomplished everything in the current AD, but before the publication date, then you may request an AMOC. The FAA has published a flow chart for the AD, and has also provided an AMOC example that should make the AMOC process fairly painless.
Select this link for the AMOC Example or paste this address into your browser https://www.faasafety.gov/files/notices/2021/Feb/AMOC_Example.pdf
Select this link for the FlowChart or paste this address in your browser https://www.faasafety.gov/files/notices/2021/Feb/Flow_Chart.pdf
For questions, contact William D. McCully (Dan) via email at email@example.com
Area of Concern: On July 5, 2014, an accident occurred in Parma, New York where the aluminum seat belt mounting bracket, part number 0425132, failed after the Cessna 140 overturned. Per design, the brackets were manufactured via aluminum for early model Cessna 120 and 140 airplanes. Cessna Aircraft Company changed the design to steel for later model Cessna 120 and 140 airplanes and now only provides steel brackets as a replacement part for the aluminum bracket. Click below to see the AOC.
Notice Number: NOTC1439
There has been a long history of the FAA addressing Piper Cherokee fuel selector valves. Due to a recent accident that precipitated the FAA to issue an Airworthiness Concern Sheet (ACS) querying operators on the prevalence and issues associated with the use of generation one (1) fuel selector valves in the current fleet. Based on the response the FAA received, it is recommended that we remind the flying public of SAIB CE-14-22 and emphasize familiarity with the operation of and proper maintenance of the fuel selector valve as outlined in SAIB CE-14-22.
Recently an accident occurred where the rudder on a PA-12 failed in flight. The airplane was a seaplane equipped with a 160 hp Lycoming O-320 engine. The original tail surfaces had been replaced with PA-18 tail surfaces in accordance with a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC). The broken upper part of the rudder post broke just above the top hinge and the upper part of the rudder folded over the tail brace wires in such a way that rudder control was severely limited and as to effectively create an additional horizontal tail, driving the tail down and the nose up.
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Diamond Aircraft Industries Models DA 40, DA 40 F, and DA 40 NG airplanes. The AD addresses an issue with fuel tank connection hose deterioration that could result in contamination of the fuel system and restriction of fuel flow. The AD, effective August 4, 2020, requires actions to address the unsafe condition of these products. See the AD for more details.
Proposed AD Affects Roughly 6,600 Cessna Aircraft
A proposed airworthiness directive stands to affect 6,586 Cessna 180, 182, and 185 models, driven by a report of cracks found in the tailcone and horizontal stabilizer attachment on a 185 that had displayed excessive play while undergoing maintenance. “After a detailed inspection, the tailcone reinforcement braces were found cracked on both sides of the airplane,” according to the FAA’s proposed AD document.
Upon investigation of other related models from the same general age cohort, the FAA found similar cracking on 29 additional airplanes. “The FAA determined that the combination of the attachment structure design and high loads during landing contribute to the development of cracks in the tailcone and horizontal stabilizer attachment structure,” reported the proposed AD. “This condition, if unaddressed, could result in failure of the horizontal stabilizer to tailcone attachment and lead to tail separation with consequent loss of control of the airplane.” Guidance already exists in the most part for the remedy of the AD, as the FAA determined that Textron Aviation Single Engine Mandatory Service Letter SEL-55-01, dated December 7, 2017, calls for inspection and remediation of the same areas on the empennage of those Cessna models. The action’s comment period ends on June 29, 2020, so pilots are encouraged to weigh in soon if they have valuable information or opinions to share.
Thanks to Flying Magazine for this article.
July 16, 2020 UPDATE: (SAIB) AIR-20-10 on May 29, 2020 for Cessna 210 airplanes.
The FAA issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) AIR-20-10 on May 29, 2020 for Cessna 210 airplanes affected by AD 2020-03-16. The SAIB advises owners and operators of four alternative methods of compliance (AMOCs) associated with AD 2020-03-16. One of the Global AMOCs available extends the compliance time for the AD to September 9, 2020 due to difficulty meeting the original 60 day compliance time due to factors associated with the COVID-19 virus. The SAIB also addresses some commonly asked questions associated with AD 2020-03-16. Please select SAIB to link to the SAIB posted in the FAA's Regulatory and Guidance Library.
The FAA has extended the compliance time due to the Covid-19 virus.
The FAA has issued a Global AMOC (Alternative Method of Compliance) for AD 2020-03-16 to extend the compliance time from 60 days to September 9, 2020. This extension changes the compliance time from 60 days to approximately 180 days. The original 20 hours time-in-service (TIS) compliance time identified in AD 2020-03-16 remains the same.
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Textron Aviation Inc. (Textron) (type certificate previously held by Cessna Aircraft Company) Models 210G, T210G, 210H, T210H, 210J, T210J, 210K, T210K, 210L, T210L, 210M, and T210M airplanes. This AD requires visual and eddy current inspections of the carry-thru spar lower cap, corrective action if necessary, application of a protective coating and corrosion inhibiting compound (CIC), and reporting the inspection results to the FAA. This AD was prompted by the in-flight break-up of a Model T210M airplane in Australia, due to fatigue cracking that initiated at a corrosion pit, and subsequent reports of other Model 210-series airplanes with widespread and severe corrosion.
There are somewhere near 50 RV's owned by EAA288 members, many of them "A" models and maybe a few hundred or more varieties of other aircraft owned by our members. In the Van's world, there have been numerous discussions in the media and around airports about the RV "A" models and the nose wheel design. Recently on the Vans Air Force website there was a discussion regarding an RV-9A accident at an Australian airport. The official accident report can be found at the following link: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2017/aair/ao-2017-001/
A most interesting video taken from a camera mounted under the left wing of the accident aircraft adds a tremendous amount of information to be considered. While making no comments about the cause, I found the report and companion video an excellent learning experience causing one to think about landing, or recovering from a "bounce" and continuing to land the aircraft or going around. Something all pilots should consider while on final approach (or even in advance of that). This thought process should be applied to each individual's aircraft. After all, our aircraft are not all created equally (neither are the pilots). Think about what you would do!
Should you choose to watch the video, the settings icon (the geared wheel) on the lower right corner has options for the watching the video at different speeds. For instance, using the .25 video speed versus the normal speed, provides a different perspective of the accident. (Note: While both people on board survived, they were seriously injured.)
The FAA issued its FINAL RULE on an AD affecting 14,653 CESSNA SINGLES in the U.S. and probably at least as many in the rest of the world. The new rule requires repeated inspection of the spot where the strut meets the lower door post. The AD affects models ranging from mid-production 172s to the latest models. It was first proposed in May of 2020 after cracks were found in the lower area of the forward cabin doorpost bulkhead of some 206 and 207 models. The AD applies to aircraft that share the same design of the bulkhead and strut attach point.
This just in from Flying Magazine:
The rumblings have been going on for some time as to what the next chapter would be for the Mooney aircraft company, with a minimal amount of activity continuing to quietly sustain the business over the last 9 months. Now, what has been rumor turns to fact: Mooney’s new owners revealed themselves in an open letter from the new CEO, Jonny Pollack, posted on the company’s home page on September 1.